L’inerzia del Parlamento e quella della Corte in alcuni ambiti dell’indirizzo politico costituzionale

The paper addresses the issue of the constitutional political direction (“indirizzo politico costituzionale”) between Parliament and Constitutional Court, taking into consideration the bidirectional relationship between the two bodies. In particular, on the one hand we intend to observe the Court's decision-making typologies and the parliamentary inertia that follows or precedes them. On the other hand, we intend to highlight a side in which it is the Court that is excessively cautious, while it is Parliament (or, rather, individual MPs) that asks for a sort of protection from the constitutional judge. In both directions, therefore, it seems possible to identify some areas of inertia: and it is this double inertia that we attempt to investigate in the paper, because in the relationship between Constitutional Court and Parliament, the seats of political direction and constitutional political direction are called into question in various ways.